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THE PRACTICING SELF:
THEORY OF PERSONHOOD 1

DEAN G. BLEVINS

INTRODUCTION

Nature or nurture, ego or environment, self or social setting; personality theorists
have long struggled to construct a theory of personhood that adequately embraces
both influence and agency Early theories of determinism, whether socially
determined (Watson, Skinner) or internally driven (Freud) often left ego development, at best, as a mediating force with little real intentionality? Humanistic theories
<Rogers) often elevated human agency without fully explaining the etiology/
organizing schema of that selfsame agency in the face of social forces.3
With the onset of a postmodem emphasis on the social construction of the self,
personality theorists enjoy a new opportunity and challenge to adequately explain
the relationship between social construction and human "novelty" (what is unique
to human agency).4 Theorists working within Wesleyan circles understand articulating such a relationship is particularly important for a view of personhood that
theologically corresponds to the Wesleyan notion of "responsible" grace. s Often
human participation in the life of God, best conceived through soteriological
categories, include the idea of theosis or deification. 6 Often unstated is whether this
participatory nature is actually a part of our creatureliness. In other words, can
"participation" be understood as a part of theological anthropology through God's
first work of grace .. creation? Beyond deterministic models of ego development
and expressive articulations of human actualization, there may be a via media in the
idea of personality that engages and emerges from "practice," a term similar to
participation but one that suggests a particular quality in the participatory act.
The following is a preliminary exploration of human personality through the lens
of practice. This new description of the "self' anchored in the notion of "practice,"
suggests a term that describes conditioned but intentional action interrelated and
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often interdependent with social influence. The sources for this approach to the self reside
both within and outside traditional psychological theory. Theorists as divergent as philosophers Alasdair Macintyre, Calvin Schrag, and ritual theorist Catherine Bell provide
resources or perhaps "clues" that inform this theory. In addition, psychologist Erik H.
Erikson provides important additional theoretical support to inform this new construction
of "practicing" personhood.
CLUES TO THE PRACTICING SELF: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Any development of the theory of the practicing self should probably address several
key considerations implicit in the definition and resident within the broader conversation
of personality theory today (the rise of postmodernity, the organic relationship between
person and community, the psychological warrants that inform theory construction). Each
consideration provides clues to a more fully informed idea of the practicing self. This
exploration proceeds through various frameworks, including:
A definition of what is meant by the term practice (since it will modify
notions of selfhood);
A framework for articulating the relationship between individual practice
and communal practice (explored under the rubric of ritual);
A dialog between this view of personhood and other postmodern
depictions of the self;
An exploration of one existing approach to personality theory, particularly
from a psychological viewpoint, that informs the final understanding of the
practicing self.
In a contemporary climate, each of these considerations informs an authentic view of the
self, beginning with the concept of practice. The study continues addressing social practice
via ritual, to postmodern notions of personhood. All three reviews provide a backdrop to
a conversation with personality theory.
DEFINING PRACTICE

The idea of practice emerges from early Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle, but is
best articulated through contemporary philosopher Alasdair Macintyre in his text After
Virtue.7 MacIntyre offers a cogent definition of what constitutes appropriate human practice. Macintyre writes,
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that
form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence, which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.s
Maclntyre's definition reveals five basic characteristics of practice
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I ) Coherent activity (materially connected actions)
2) Complexity
3) Social acknowledgement and cooperation (i.e., a social fabric around the
practice)
4) Goods internal to the activity provide both impetus and means for judging
excellence and success (i.e., some worth intrinsic within the practice itself)
5) There are conceptual frameworks (i.e., a "grammar") within the practice that
provide the means to pursue and actually extend excellence.
Macintyre's definition will provide a later referent. For now, his articulation nuances the
difference between the term "participation" and "practice." We may participate in a number of socially engendered activities but not fully engage in practice. As Macintyre writes,
"Bricklaying is not a practice, architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice, farming is.
So are the inquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of the historian,
and so are painting and music."9 In a sense Macintyre is arguing for an aesthetic quality to
the activity that participation does not always reference.
Macintyre offers one additional definition that is helpful in describing the nature of the
practicing self. In his definition of virtue, Macintyre writes,
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and
the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. IO
Macintyre notes that participants must submit to the grammar of a practice and submit to
other practitioners in order to obtain a level of authentic practice. The willingness to do so
requires virtues like justice, courage and honesty to acknowledge both one's place and
one's need in relationship to the practice and other practitioners. Macintyre writes "every
practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in it.""
Regardless of personal preference, virtues define the type of relationship persons have as
they share purposes and practices.
Macintyre's definitions of practice and virtue inform not only a general definition of
personality, they also suggest a particular quality concerning the nature of an authentic
self. This qualitative reference may suggest goals for therapeutic care as well. More will be
said later.
PRACTICE AND RITUAL

Practice may also be a common term for articulating the relationship between various
aspects of the self and the social life of the community. As noted earlier, one of the postmodern challenges may well be to have a theory of relationships that describe both interpersonal and intrapersonal transactions in similar fashion, or at least acknowledges their
mirrored proc1ivities. 12 If "practice" defines the emergence of the self, perhaps "ritual," as a
socially defining term, provides additional clues to the nature of practice.
Catherine Bell notes in anthropology practice may have replaced the concept of "structure" as the dominant image for cultural analysis. 13 Bell writes,

26

Blevins
In contrast to the static view of structuralism, which tends to see human activity
as a matter of enacting cultural rules, practice theory claims to take seriously the
ways in which human activities, as formal as a religious ritual or as casual as a
midday stroll, are creative strategies by which human beings continually reproduce and reshape their social and cultural environments. 14

Bell chooses to focus on ritual as a form of cultural practice that integrates cultural
thought and action.
Bell asserts rituals are practices "that construct particular types of meanings and values
in specific ways." " Bell, in her own overview of ritual, notes that her approach to ritual is
relatively new. Previous studies have tended to emphasize overarching definitions that
link ritual to social cohesion and intensity, to the advance of symbolic information
through action, or to structured patterns of practices that spark mental concepts in
individuals. 16 Each approach to ritual, including social processes, symbolic meaning and
value, and tactical reasoning, provide helpful insight into a specific set of cultural activities.17
Bell, however, believes that no one ritual practice exists alone but is actually part of a
larger economy of practices. Bell writes,
It is usually one ceremony among many in the larger ritual life of a person or
community, one gesture among a multitude of gestures both sacred and profane, one embodiment among others of traditions of behavior down from one
generation to another. In other words, for each and every ritual, there is a thick
context of social customs, historical practices, and day-to-day routines that, in
addition to the unique factors at work in any given moment in time and space,
influence whether or how a ritual action is performed. 18
In this sense of ritual, each practice always exists within a larger economy of activities.
Exactly how knowledge is conveyed through ritual action is uncertain due to the
diversity of interpretations on the nature of ritual. Each gesture contributes to the larger
ritual. The arrangement and order of such gestures may create a different language or
"grammar" of meaning. 19 The symbolic meaning of each gesture in isolation must be
balanced against the broader ritual or practicing context. Within the psyche of the
participant the association of action and thought merge through either kinethesia or
synesthesia (or a combination of both) into a dawning awareness of greater meaning?O
Bell emphasizes that ritualized practices contribute to a world of cultural meaning. As
persons participate they gain a form of ritual mastery that begins to interpret the rest of
life situations in light of these practices. Mastery of ritualized practices creates a type of
embodied knowing which influences other situations in life by making them "more
coherent with the values of the ritualizing schemes."zi Corporate actions provide a new
perception of the world where mastery allows participants to see themselves and the
world differently.zz Bell argues that the ritual process focuses on the tel os of the anticipated
emergence of the new person or focuses upon the new consensus of values and behaviors that should shape the community but often ignoring the very processes that may
enhance or subvert this goal.23
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PRACTICE AND POSTMODERN DEPICTIONS OF PERSONHOOD

As already noted, postmodern philosophical discussions have also centered upon
issues of the illusive self. Calvin Schrag writes,
Confronted with the mosaic messages dealing with the death of the man (sid,
the demise of the author, and the deconstruction or dissimulation of the subject,
one finds oneself in a crisis of concepts relative to matters pertaining to the
human self, understood as subject and agent in discourse and action.24
Schrag responds to these shifting forces by embracing a four-fold postmodern depiction of
identity as the self in discourse (the narrating self), in action (the embodied/enacted self),
in community (the ethical praxis of the self), and as the self in transcendence (the self
before radical alterity). Each of Schrag's depictions answers "who" instead of "what"
questions concerning selfhood (not what is a self). Who is speaking, Who is acting, Who
responds to other selves, and Who stands within and before transcendence.25 Schrag is
not interested in reconciling all four depictions but each lend light upon a final
understanding practice and personality.
Schrag's definition of the "self-in-discourse" centers on the power of speech: past, present
and future. Noting the multiplicity of "changing profiles and even the "plurality of
language games," Schrag contends some sense of the self remains present to itself, past,
present and future, through discourse. 26 Yet there can be numerous discourses in a person's
life. What holds multiple discourses together is the presence of narrativity, an overarching
story-form that holds together various discourses across time.27 Ultimately Schrag argues
that for us to name the "who" in "who is talking" is to explore the narrative self identity,
overcoming the issue of time (continuity) in the telling of his/ her story,z8 He writes,
The story of the self is a developing story; a story subject to creative advance,
wherein the past is never simply a series of nows that have lapsed into non being, but a text, an inscription of events and experiences, that stands open to new
interpretations and new perspectives of meaning?9
Ultimately Schrag calls persons homo narrans, where the concept of character becomes
particularly relevant in identifying the various stages of the developing narrative concerning the self.3°
Along with the narrating self, Schrag incorporates the self in action, where character is
made explicit through concrete activity?' Schrag's definition of action seeks to overcome
the mindlbody split of previous philosophical traditions by naming the material, the reality
that we are embodied knowers engaged in reflective (praxis) bodily involvements and
activities.32 Schrag notes that embodiment provides an understanding of space the same
way narrative provides a means for the self to occupy time. He writes,
The body as a dimension of selfhood does not occupy space- at least not in the
sense that one would speak of a coffee cup taking up room in its being placed
on a table, or being placed anywhere for that matter. The body inhabits space, it
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does not simply occupy it.

Shrag's emphasis on embodiment leads to actions. Actions, however, are not isolated,
they exist in a framework of communicative praxis, deliberative decision making, via
agencies of empowerment and enactmentH Actions are also embedded in broader social
practices (remembering and reclaiming the pasO, while actions are also anticipatory of
future events: "of future practices yet to be performed."l4
Schrag's emphasis on discourse and action, rhetoric and praxis, leads to political
considerations of living in community. Schrag offers that narrative and action always
occur in the presence of interlocutors (the "who" of community) who often influence any
understanding of selfhood, "engendering a shift of focus from the self as present to itself
to the self as present to, for, and with the other."ls Schrag acknowledges that there is a
tension between the "we-experience" and the "I-experience," but maintains that
community is crucial for narrative and action. "Community is more like the binding
textuality of our discourse and the integrating purpose of our action."36 Community,
framed in the Greek concept of polis, implies certain ethical and moral dimensions to
living, so that self-actualization always exists within communal interdependence. The
desire of self-actualization introduces the function of responsivity (to the community)
while the complementary necessity of interdependence calls forth the function of
responsibility (with its moral implications in a social world>. Disceming the relationship
between responsivity and responsibility becomes the task of the conscience (supplying the
moral dimension to the narrative of self in community); however, Schrag does not understand "conscience" as conjured subjectivity, but as a response to the "other."l7 This
hermeneutical determination of action overtums the notion that the self is purely contextdetermined, but leaves open the necessity of the acting self as context-conditioned.38
Finishing the tour Schrag closes by exploring the self in transcendence. Schrag begins
noting that each previous view carries implicit references to the transcendent. That
discourse always includes a surplus of meaning, action gestures toward more than what
the self has already become, and community always suggests even greater configurations
of social practices and communal involvements beyond the immediate matrix 39 This
allows Schrag to acknowledge a sense of alterity, a notion of "that which is Other."
Philosophically Schrag is reluctant to posit the full nature of the Other as distinct from, or
continuous with, creation. He also notes in a postmodem world that a claim to "universality"
is problematic if it flattens notions of diversity, heterogeneity and the incommensurability
of certain concepts. Instead, Schrag calls for a notion of "transversal," a concept where the
alterity of the Other becomes defined by the infinite complexity of various perspectives in
an open-textured gathering of expanding possibilities. He writes, "As such it is a dynamics
of unification that is always an 'ing,' a process of unifying, rather than an 'ed,' a finalized
result.40 The interweaving and holding together of pattems characterizes a transcendent
Other (God) described most by love. The existence of the personal self before this
Transcendent Other is best understood as a surplus of that love, of gift, out of which the
self responds.
Schrag's definition of the transcendence probably deserves greater nuance (Jjke the
other descriptions>. As a collage <with Bell's description of ritual and Maclntyre's definition
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of practice) the various descriptions provide clues to a framing of the practicing self.
However, such clues may be incomplete without resources from within the field of
personality theory. Are there theorists whose views resonate with the description set forth
in philosophy and social theory? One such theorist provides bridge-points, Erik H. Erikson.
ERIK ERIKSON, CONVERSATIONS AROUND PRACTICE

Within the field of psychology one theorist may prove particularly helpful in fleshing
out how the concept of practice informs the self. Erik Erikson's work is often "flattened"
in many basic psychology textbooks due to his stage theory, the eight ages of the life
cycle: ' Admittedly this theory is predominant in his work. 42 Unfortunately the heavy
influence of the universality of the stages tends to bestow Erikson with the now dubious
label of modemist. Erikson, like most stage theorists, tended to faU into disrepute with
postmodem critiques. Critics implicitly or explicitly assume that any theory developed on
enlightenment principles that mitigate altemative theories of the social construction of the
self. 43 Recovering Erikson's contributions, however, may be helpful even in the midst of
postmodem critique, particularly in understanding the practicing self.
Erik Erikson's contributions to personality theory, particularly as an extension of an
admitted psychoanalytic framework, provide key insights into the notion of practice and
self-hood. Erikson, from as early as 1944, tried to relate the interior world of the child in
development with the circumstances of society, culture and history. In doing so he
distanced himself to some degree from his contemporaries in psychoanalytic thought
{including both Sigmund and Anna Freud):4 While influential in religious circles,
particularly Christian education, the fullness of his theory is often overlooked in a
postmodem milieu'"
This oversight might be problematic since the psychoanalytic tradition (which shaped
Erikson) remains evident in postmodem circles. Sigmund Freud's influence is clear,
particularly through such postmodem thinkers as Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault,
though many struggle to reconcile Freud's deconstructive contributions with his modem
inclinations: 6 Sophie Freud acknowledges the limits of her grandfather's theories, but also
recasts them in more current contextual theories of neuroscience and cognitive theory to
situate him in a postmodem context. 47 Carl Jung, a theorist with a long history of dialogue
with Christian thought48 also undergoes reconsideration regardless of Jung's reputation as
the epitome of modernist thinking:9 lung appears to contribute substantially to a
postmodem perspective, particularly opposing the over-rational world by skirting pure
scientific reasoning. 50 Erikson, as a member of this tradition might stand equal re-visioning
within a postmodem framework. 51
ERIKSON'S CONTRIBUTIONS

As noted Erikson is often best known for his eight ages or stage theory that he constantly addresses in his publications. Erikson is clearly a unique theorist, combining his aesthetic
interests as an artist with his scientific rationality to provide a kind of left hand (imaginative)
and right hand (rational) view of human personalitys2 Erikson himself emphasized the
"art-and-science" of psychoanalysis.'3 Contemporary psychologists often see Erikson as a
helpful dialog partner to later expressions of psychoanalytic thinking such as object
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relations or other transactional theories, providing both a bridge and a critique to these
newer theories. 54 One might debate whether Erikson's own perspective changed over the
years, from an early indebtedness to Freud to a later incorporation of Christian existential
thought. Nevertheless, Erikson is seen as a major transitional figure in analytic thought,
and his general "psychosocial" perspective makes his theory inviting.55
There are key tenets to Erikson's thought that might inform any theory construction of
the practicing self. Each tenet in and of itself provides a nuanced understanding of personality, understood variously as the ego, identity and self (distinct but overlapping terms) S6
However, the interplay between the personal and the social reveals particular insight. 57
Beyond actual stage theory, the interplays addressed include: I) Erikson's description of
the interaction between epigenesis (as a biological and psychological drive theory) with
ethos; 2) his appreciation of historical actuality in conversation with an existential
self/ social awareness; and 3) his acknowledgement of the place of interpersonal ritual and
personal virtue (a key component to Macintyre as welD . Categorical combinations may
appear arbitrary and overlapping to be sure, however, they do provide a framework for
exploration.
EPIGENESIS AND ETHOS

Erikson might best be appreciated for his underlying psycho-social theory of epigenesis
in relationship. Epigenesis, a theory borrowed from embryology, addresses the step-bystep growth of fetal organs. Erikson believed the concept could analogically describe all
facets of growth of the human organism (including ego developmentJ.58 This growth
includes crucial developmental crises that affect the overall maturation project. Ultimately,
Erikson's identity development theory contains not only biological and psychological
tasks; it contains social interaction as well. Erikson distinguishes his theory from the
traditional psychoanalytic theory, the individual's inner "economics" of drive and
defense/ 9 opting instead for an "ecology" that includes biological, psychic and communal
forces that are mutually interdependent and developmental. 6o Erikson states:
We must find the nexus of social images and of organismic forces- and this not
merely in the sense that her images and forces are, as the saying goes, "interrelated." More than this : the mutual complementation of ethos and ego, of group
identity and ego identity, puts a greater common potential at the disposal of
both ego synthesis and social organization 6l
Erikson's perspective fueled his stage theory, and also introduced key social "institutions"
(motherhood, parenting, school, etc.) crucial to growth. However, true to Erikson's lefthanded thinking, theorists are left with a "chicken-and-egg" question, whether the ego
exists as a result of conditioning by social forces or whether social institutions exist due to
the needs of the individual? Obviously any answer proves incomplete; however, it
becomes clear that Erikson saw his theory informing not only ego identity but also guiding also our understanding of social organization (at least the quality of said organizations).
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ACTUALITY AND AWARENESS

Erikson's interest in the psychosocial leads him to an expanding interaction with not
only the immediate social world but also with the larger historical setting persons find
themselves in. This view arises from Erikson's central conviction that the 'socio' part of
identity requires an awareness of the community that exists/influences the individual. As
Erikson says, "No ego is an island to itself."62 Erikson develops this historical consciousness
first by developing the concept of actuality in response to psychoanalysis' emphasis upon
psychological "reality" or an interior emphasis on self-awareness opposed to broader social
condition (or outerworld). Erikson writes,
Maybe our habitual reference to man's environment as an "outer world" attest,
more than any other single item, to the fact that the world of that intuitive and
active participation which constitutes most of our waking life is still foreign
territory to our theory. This term more than any other, represent the Cartesian
strait jacket we have imposed on our model of man, who in some of our
writings seems to be most himself when reflecting horizontally-like a supine
baby or a reclining patient, or like Descartes himself, taking to his bed to cogitate
on the extensive world 63
Erikson opposes such a view, even correcting some of Freud's insights by positing that
persons" acting out" might have meaning beyond interior drives 64 Instead Erikson argues
for a reality that includes a state of being actual, present, current, and immediate.
Actuality (as an awareness of actual external events) complements rather than
invalidates self-awareness. Erikson continues,
Reality, then (to repeat this), is the world of phenomenal experience, perceived
with a minimum of distortion and a maximum of customary validation agreed
upon in a given state of technology and culture; while actuality is the world of
participation, shared with other participants with a minimum of defensive
maneuvering and a maximum of mutual activation. 6s
This complementary awareness drives Erikson to consider not only social actuality but also
historical actuality as a primary locus for understanding personal self-knowledge and
personal participation. Such awareness drew Erikson into his interest in psycho-history, such
as Hitler, Luther, Gandhi, and Thomas Jefferson. 66 In these investigations the material actions
of "psycho-historical actualities" (historical facts) have immediate impact on current health. 67
Yet in the midst of Erikson's emphasis on historical forces and participation, he was
also interested in the immediate experiencing self. Erik would speak the 'T in
conversation with the "we." Erikson writes,
I mean the sense of ''j'' that is the individual's central awareness of being a
sensory and thinking creature endowed with language, who can confront a self
(composed, in fact, of a number of selves), and can construct a concept of an
unconscious ego.68
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Erikson saw this "1" endowed, he writes, "with a sense of being centered and active, whole
and aware-and thus overcoming a feeling of being peripheral or inactivated, fragmented
and obscured."69 In 1982, Erikson did not see the study of this existential, "personological"
and linguistic "fact" of the ''I'' a prominent intellectual project, even though this overarching
awareness created continuity for people experiencing multiple experiencing selves over
time. However the theme is the very focal point of his most in-depth treatment of Jesus'
Galilean sayings. 70 Erikson asserted that this self-experiencing also included the capacity to
enter into a deep relationship of mutual understanding, a "we," 71 that included our
awareness of significant others (the "thou" of a mother) and of our own interior "self'
which Erikson describes as "almost any Inner Other."n Erikson's existential view of the
self, in conversation with his belief in "actual" participation, illuminates Erik's interest in
both a personal, social and historical "awareness" in describing the experiencing self.
RITUAL AND VIRTUE

Erikson's depiction of actuality (actual sociaVhistorical influences in people's lives) leads
him to an understanding that personal identity is deeply conditioned by one's response to
these same influences via rituals. Human beings are homo ludens as well as homo sapiens.73
Erikson defines ritual as a "certain kind of informal and yet prescribed interplay between
persons who repeat it at meaningful intervals and in recurring
contexts."74 Ritualization (beginning with the ritual interplay between mother and newborn) does more than describe the activities of interchange that meet needs of babe and
mother. The everyday distinctive patterns between parent and child also frame the child's
emergent understanding of the "Other," (indeed the primary Other according to Erikson)
and the 'T' (as distinguished as the Not Other). Ritualization, as concrete human activity,
forms more than informs self-identity?5
Erikson finds correspondence between everyday ritualizations and the grand rituals of
the culture in which these activities take place (including the institutions that sustain
persons on their journey through the life course). The correspondence of personal and cultural practice becomes particularly important as it ushers in a sense of the numinous for
Erikson, which he calls "the aura of hallowed presence."76 Erikson continues, "the numinous assures us, ever again, of separateness transcended and yet also of distinctiveness confirmed, and thus of the very basis of a sense of '1."'77 The concept of ritualization reveals a
form of self that emerges from practice, not only in the engagement of child and mother,
but in the engagement with other meaningful expressions of human action and interaction.
Erikson notes that rituals are "playful," yet they also embody serious responses born
out of human interaction. However Erikson indicates it is a myth to assume that "play" is
only a childhood mode. Erikson also acknowledges that these actions can be harmful,
distinguishing between dynamic ritualizations and compulsive ritualisms that restrict
human vision and action.78 Even grand ritual patterns run this danger. Erikson writes,
The greatest ritualizations can eventually become repetitive and the minutest
daily rituals compulsive-whereupon devotion to revered images can become
idolism, adherence to detailed laws can become legalism, and reliance on dogma
can become dogmatism?9
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Overall, however, Erikson sees ritualization as an active process that not only situates
relations between persons but also with society and the boundaries of transcendence.
Erikson's emphasis on activity (ritualization) is complemented by one additional theory,
the role of virtues. Erikson ties virtues directly to the psychosocial stages, but their overall
characteristics are particularly helpful for this investigation. Bo Erikson was aware that there
would be a tendency to associate his idea of virtue with genetic predisposition (character
"traits") and tries meticulously to avoid this misunderstanding while also acknowledging
virtues remain a "natural" process. Erikson's basic definition of virtue would be adaptive
strength, the ability to negotiate and resolve the key turning points (crises) along the life
cycle. Yet adaptive strength remains more than merely covert survival theory (following
Freud or Darwin), and resists placing humanity at the center of all things. 81 Virtues are
susceptible to aberration, but they remain necessary to Erikson's understanding of
personhood. He writes,
The basic virtues enumerated here have their illusory side which can develop into
grand delusions of vain virtuousness, and lead to specific rages of disillusionment.
Yet each is indispensable, and each is necessary for the ensemble which is man at
his most balanced; while all in moment of humor and wisdom, in prayer,
meditation, and self-analysis, can be charitably transcended. B2
These virtues, like ritualizations, are vitally connected to the person's life cycle and social
relationships 83 The virtues speak to both inward capacity (strength .. though an ineffable
quality for Erikson for all his precision with other concepts) and interpersonal mutuality.B4
Erikson's concepts are helpful in a construal of the practicing self that takes seriously
both the "outer-world" and the "inner-world" of identity There does seem to be
resonance with a number of theorists on the notion of practice as a social (ritual) as well
as personal strategic activity (ritualizations), a concept that dialogs with constructive
postmodern deliberations about the nature of the self. Collectively these theories
interweave to form a mosaic of personality that emerges through practice.
PERSONALITY AND PRACTICE

Keeping in mind the four theoretical streams reviewed one might begin to construct or
describe a personality theory under the rubric of practice, both as a hermeneutic for
individual and social behavior. The practicing self begins in biological actions that are
embedded within a social matrix much like Bell's larger ritual actions always occur in a
matrix of social practices. As the body grows and adapts (following Erikson's notions of
epigenesis) the child also interacts with surrounding sources of care and influence. Human
"personality" emerges in patterned interactions or micro-practices (ritualization for Erikson)
reveal coherent and consistent exchanges between child and care-giver/environment.
These smaller ritual practices resemble broader rituals embedded in the fabric of society.

Meaning is bestowed in both circumstances as the ritual micro-practices situate themselves
and personal responses encourage a sense of mastery (empowerment) and meaning.
If Erikson is correct, identity (ego) emerges both as a differentiation between a personal
awareness of "self' and external "others" (caregivers) and between self and "inner-other"
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(representations of caregivers and child) by means of these actual rituals/practices. Human
acting (practice) and human identity intertwine, much like human empowerment and
social identity intertwine in social ritual. "J" do not possess practices, T' am also constituted
as a result of practices that occur in a social/relational environ. Human practice and
human identity mutually intertwine within an interpersonal web of relationships. The
practices constitute an ''I'' alongside a "We" (if Erikson is accurate) as complex relations
(interpersonal and intrapersonal "grammar") expands over the life course.
The emergence of the practicing self always occurs in conversation with the
historical/cultural circumstance, with the existential awareness of who "J" am in relation to
"we," and with an anticipation of future growth since the epigenetic process does not
stop. These temporal stages reveal the ongoing story of the "my" life in narrative fashion.
Negotiating between these three temporal influences (past, present and future) requires
adaptive strength or "virtue" to insure intemal impetus in the face of contextual forces. In
this framework of personhood, virtue may serve both MacIntyre's and Erikson's definitions
of authenticity, empowerment, as well as adaptive strength. Virtue enables the practicing
self to achieve a quality of development (the "goods") necessary to be authentic. Virtue
allows one to "seek the good within the practice" as MacIntyre alludes, by seeking the
good (adaptation) of emerging personality in the face of contextual forces . The concept of
virtue emerges as an important bridging category, since personal agency and contextual
participation become inter-joined via enactment. One can acknowledge that the quality of
the selfs "response" (virtue) to contextual forces includes interior consideration or agency
which mitigates against social construction as purely social manipulation.
Existentially "(" emerge from the practices (ritualizations) embedded in society
However, T' become self-aware and aware of the "other" through interpersonal,
intra personal, and transversal practices all resident in life. Ultimately ''I'' become aware
how one's life must conform to some intuited grammar construed through the various
practices, and can conceive of my own life as a given practice (operating in society as a
matrix of rituals as welD. This nuanced concept of personhood acknowledges that human
response must always be authentic to personal practice as well as social/ historical
influence. Such a view helps to differentiate this approach from a strict behaviorism. It
also opens the door to therapeutic concems as counselors and ministers attend to the
authenticity of personal practice.
Education and counseling the practicing self would take into consideration the "actuality"
(Erikson) or social fabric (MacIntyre), as well as the psychological state of the person.
Counseling questions might actually attend to MacIntyre's emphasis on the person's sense
of coherence and the person constitutes their sense of intrinsic worth. Attending to this
type of "grammar" reveals the range of practices necessary to pursue wholeness. The
language of "grammar" might actually guide the counselor's selection of appropriate
therapeutic methods. This hermeneutic might be more fruitful than other strategies that
acknowledge the range of therapeutic practices, but do little to guide counselors beyond
advocating for "responsible eclecticism."Bs Therapy itself might be seen as a ritual action
but also one that occurs in a myriad of practices that contribute to health.
Beyond counseling strategies, MacIntyre's typology, in conversation with Schrag, might
provide a fruitful postmodem personality theory. For instance, considering the practicing
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self as a coherent activity raises questions concerning the forces that hold personhood
together with some material connectedness. One might begin with Schrag's treatment in
how the practicing selfs actions cohere over time (through narrative), space (embodied
action) and relationship (Characterl. Personal development is not merely a series of stages,
instead development continues with an ever increasing complexity of the self, often based
on the number of rituals and emergent virtues that are always in conversation. This ongoing complexity may graciously mirror the complex relations of the triune God,
relations whose transversal complexity far exceeds human complexity, expressed in
humans as a form of "gift." This need not imply a natural continuity between divinity and
humanity, as Schrag notes, the sheer range of complex relationships in the
transversal/triune God creates a different sense of transcendence but one perhaps more
radical than previously imagined. 86 However, the potential complexity resident in this
view of human personhood does suggest that the "image and likeness" of the triune God,
a gift to humanity, might reveal itself in the myriad practices that bring persons and
communities together in specific ways. Certainly particular social "rituals" (liturgy) might
then transform via the Spirit of God in rewriting the "grammar" of one's life in dramatic
fashion. Yet this transformative process (and the dramatic "events" resident within them)
would not be alien to those practices that do influencelconstitute the self. Transformation
of persons involves the transformation of the social/ritual matrix that form and inform
personal practices. No matter how immediate and dramatic transformative moments
might be, ultimately persons would need to be adopted into communities where more
redemptive practices form and inform their own sense of personhood via myriad practices
resident in the community and emergent in themselves.
CONCLUSION

As originally noted, Maddox's notion of Responsible grace (or John Cobb's Grace and
Responsibility) portrays Wesley's proclivity to explain human transformation as a response
to the prevenient grace of God in its various expressions. 8? The idea of practice tries to
take such activity seriously by noting this responsive "participation" becomes constitutive
of our creatureliness or at least a significant aspect of our humanity. This view of selfhood
is somewhat similar to James Fowler's attempt to make faith a human universal, a style of
knowing and valuing that results in meaning-making. 88 If Fowler's notion of faith is
important, though primarily as a cognitive exercise (open to the same critique Erikson
gives psychoanalytic preoccupation with a cognitive view of reality), then "practice" may
be a complementary, or perhaps a more satisfactory, notion of selfhood.
However, it may be that Erikson's cautionary approach proves equally helpful since
theorizing from human experience is always a perilous task. Remarking on a meeting he
once held with Jean Piaget, Erikson reflects the differences between empiricism and clinical
method. He then notes the tenuousness of his own clinical approach. Erikson writes,
Much less cautious [than empiricistsJ, we speak with relative ease of the core of
man's personality and of stages in its development. But then, our subjects want
to become whole; and the clinician must have some theories and methods
which offer the patient a whole world to be whole in. Mistaking our patients'
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gratitude for verification, we are sometimes sure that we could explain or even
guide mankind if it would only consent to be our collective patient. 89

The desire to help people become "whole," in a theological sense to be fully participatory
with God, may also influence this depiction. This theory of personhood certainly needs to
be challenged for its potential theoretical limitations, as well as its experiential "gaps."
Hopefully, however, this new view of personhood provides a departing point for a fresh
investigation of personality and theology.
The idea of "being" woven into the theological construal of creation is the logic of
practice. This view of a "practiced" personality theory corresponds to a theological
anthropology of responsible grace, where the very "practice" of response corresponds to
the fabric of human personhood (creative grace) as well as divine influence (prevenient
grace). Identity and responsive action are intertwined in the constitution of our humanity
as well as in the salvation of our personhood. This definition of personhood might also
support the idea that salvation is not just the restoration of the image of God (in the
primitive sense of the first Adam) but a continuation of the initial project, theosis, woven in
the fabric of our being.
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